Abstract. For many proofs of knowledge it is important that only the verifier designated by the confirmer can obtain any conviction of the correctness of the proof. A good example of such a situation is for undeniable signatures, where the confirmer of a signature wants t o make sure that only the intended verifier(s) in fact can be convinced about the validity or inva1idit)y of the signature. Generally, authentication of messages and off-the-record messages are in conflict with each other. We show how, using designation of verifiers, these notions can be combined, allowing authenticated but private conversations t o take place. Our solution guarantees that only the specified verifier can be convinced by t,he proof, even if he shares all his secret information wit,h entities that want to get convinced.
Introduction

BACKGROUND. When undeniable signatures [5]
were introduced, the following scenario served as a motivation: A software vendor puts digital signatures on its products to allow it to authenticate them as correct, free of viruses, etc, but only wants paying customers to be able to verify the validity of these signatures. One property of undeniable signahres is that their validity or invalidity cannot, be verified without interaction with a prover. This in itself, however, only allows the prover t o decide when a signature is verified, and not by whom (or even by ho,w many), because of blackmailing [11, 221 and mafia3 attacks [lo] . In order to avoid these types of attacks, in both of which the conviction is transferred t o one or several hidden co-verifiers, t,he prover must b e able t o designate who will be convinced by a proof.
A4nother situation where it is important for the prover to designate who can be conviriced by t.he validity of a proof is when a voting cent,er wants only a voter himself t,o be convinced that the vote he cast was counted. Here, it is important for the voter Bob to be convinced by the proof, but we want t o prevent an armed coercer, Cindy, t,o be able to force Bob t o prove to her how he voted.
Other mrt,liorls -not, clearly stating designation of verifiers -of avoiding such attacks in order to obt8a.in receipt-free electronic voting schemes were studied in RESULTS. This paper suggests a solution, designation of uerzjiers, that resolves the conflict between authent,icity and privacy, and dodges the described attacks by limiting who can be convinced by a proof. We say that we designate a verifier in a proof when we acertain that nobody but this participant can be convinced by the proof. The intuition behind Ihe solution can be described in one sentence: Instead of provriig 0 , Alice will prove the stateinelit %ither. 0 is Ivue, or I a m Bob. " Bob will cert8ainly trust that 0 is true upon seeing such a proof4, but if Bob diverts the proof t o Cindy, Cindy will have 110 reason at all to believe that 0 is true, as Bob is fully capable of proving himself to be Bob. We show how, with only small changes in t,he confirmation protocol for undenia.ble signatures, the confirrrier can designate verifiers. Also we demonstrate that we can have designated verifier lion-interactive undeniable signatures, which combines desireable properties of ordinmy signatures and undeniable signatures.
In order to solve the problem, we will use trap-door commit,ment schemes, also known as chameleon corrirriitrnenl schemes, introduced by Brassard, Chaum and Crkpeau [4] . Assume the t>rap-door information is known to Bob only. If Alice uses t,he scheme to commit to a. value, Bob will trust her commitment as Alice caririol find collisions, but) if the proof is diverted to Cindy by Bob, Cindy has no reason t o t8rust the commitment,, as Bob can deconimit as he wishes. It is important to point out that the verifier designation holds even if the designated verifier chooses to reveal secret information t o cooperating co-verifiers, since Bob can still find collisions after revealing secret information. RELATED WORK. A large variety of digital signature schemes ( e g , [12, 23, 331) has been introduced, in which the validity of the signatures is publicly verifia.ble. On the other hand, t.here also are more authentication-like schemes, such as schemes built on zero-knowledge protocols, e.g., the Feige Fiat Shamir identification protocol [16] , where the authenticity of a message cannot be verified by anyone once the int,eractive verification session is terminated. In bet>ween Also known as the rnan-in-tshe-middle attack. give examples and applica.tions for t,his in Section 5 . In Section 6, we show how the result can be extended tto multiple designated verifiers. We discuss practical issues in Section 7, and an alt,ernative (and stronger) definition of designated verifier in the Appendix.
Approach and Model
APPROACH. Alice wants to prove to Bob -but only t,o him -that the statement 0 is true. Let @Bob be the stat,ement "I know Bob's secret key." Using the methods soon to be introduced, Alice will prove 0 V @ B~~ t o Bob, who will be convinced that 0 is true (or that his secret, key has been compromised.) Given tha.t Bob knows his secret key, Cindy will not, be convinced that 0 is true after seeing a proof of 63 V C P B~~, which holds even if Bob cooperates with her and shares secret inforniation with her. This is so since Bob can produce such a proof himself, independently of whet,lier 0 is true or not.
PARTICIPANTS. All participants arp assiii-ned to be polynomial-time limited. Partipants must only be able t o be convinced by a proof designated to them if they are able to simulate transcripts of the same distribution themselves, i.e., they have to know their secret key. (We discuss methods to ensure this in section 7.)
It is iniportant to remember lhat we want to reach our goal of designating who will be convinced by a proof for pra.gmatic reasons, in order for the use of authentication of data not to be possible to abuse with a purpose of damaging the interests of the legal participants in the read, physical world. Should an attacker be in total control of Bob's physical and mental self', then we mean that the attacker has already achieved his goal. Also, in a sense, the attacker has become Bob. We therefore mean that it is realistic assumption to make that the verifier has not totally lost control of his ability to access his data, perform calculations and freely communicate. This, in particular, excludes two possible attacks:
The Suicide Attack
Bob kills all his aliases, provides the attacker, Cindy, with his secret data, and then self-destructs. (This effectively transfers the notion of "being Bob" from Bob to Cindy.)
Cindy locks Bob (and all his aliases) up, preventing him from communicating with anybody but her, and forces him to perform certain calculations and prove them correct. (This corresponds to taking total command of somebody's mental funct,ions.)
The Demon Attack
TRUST M O D E L . h t us call a person who wants to act as a verifier in a proof, but is not, designated by the prover, a hidden verifier. We assume that a hidden verifier, Cindy, will not trust the designated verifier, Bob, that he did not produce the transcript for the proof of OV@Bob, where @Bob is a proof of knowledge of Bob's secret key, or she could just as well take his word for that 0 is true in the first place, without seeing a proof of it. In Appendix A , we introduce a weaker trust, model and a correspondingly stronger notion of designated verifier, strong designated verifier, in which Cindy trusts Bob to be perfectly honest, i.e., never to engage in a protocol that is not part of the system. (Here, trying to convince Cindy that 0 v @~~b is true is not one of the prescribed protocols.) However, Cindy can try to trick Bob to convince her by interacting in "legal" protocols. The reason why this is a weaker trust model and a stronger security notion is t,hat a protocol that is designated aer$er is not necessarily stroiig designated verifier, whereas the converse holds.
Definitions
In this section, we give informal and irituit#ive definitions.
Definition 1 Designated Verifier.
Let ( P A , PB) be a protocol for Alice to prove the truth of the statement B to Bob. in the set of possible quadruples finds ra such that c(yi, w1, T I ) = c( yi, wz, ~2 ) for the public key yi corresponding t,o the secret key xi.
Let us give two examples of trap-door schemes:
Example Trap-door coiiiiiiitnient scheme 1. [4] Secret k e y of ihe receiver: z g E, 2,. 
Signatures
We show how to change the normal verification protocol for undeniable signatures to make it designated verifier. We will base our scheme on the confirmation
Interactive Designated Verifier Proof of Undeniable
Occasionally, we will also refer to the (prover's part of the) corresponding protocol as designated verifier.
scheme for undeniable signatures[6I6. We use denotation similar to that in the original scheme: We will let p be a large prime, g a generator of G,, participant i's secret key is 2, and his public key is yz = 9"' mod p . If m is a message, participant i ' s signature on m will be s = m"' mod p .
T h e following scheme is the confirmation scheme for undeniable signatures, given in [6] 
Making it Designated Verifier:
The above scheme can be made designated verifier by letting c b e a trap-door commit,ment scheme, using the public key of the designated verifier.
Applications
Non-interactive Designated Verifier Proofs and Their
In this section we present a non-interacti,ue designated verifier proof of an undeniable signature. Such a scheme bridges the gap between publicly verifiable digital signatures and undeniable signatures, in that it limits who can verify it without help from the prover, but does not necessitate interaction. Still, and in contrast to publicly verifiable signatures that are made designated verifier, they can be used for contracts, etc., as their validity can be verified when the prover agrees to this. We helieve that this property makes them a very useful tool in balancing the need for privacy against that of authenticity.
First, we discuss a general method to transform ordinary three-move zeroknowledge protocols to non-int#eractive designated verifier proofs. Then, we examplify this metshod by showing a non-interactive undeniable signature verification scheme wit,h designation of verifiers. Our technique can be used t o obtain non-interact,ive, non-transitive signatures [28] .
Non-Interactive Designated Verifier Proofs
An ordinary three-move zero-knowledge protocol can be described as a commit -challenge -response prot,ocol. T h e Fiat-Shamir technique [18] is a famous trick for making such a protocol non-interactive, while preserving the security of the protocol in a practical manner [17] . By generating challenges from a hashed value We show the "folklore generalization" of this scheme, in which the commitment scheme is not specified. of multiple commitments, the three moves can be collapsed into one single move. However, this resulting transcript is in itself a transitive proof whose correctness can be verified by anyone.
In order to construct a designakd verifier proof, we modify the scheme and use a trap-door commitment in the commitment stage. It becomes a designated verifier proof, as Bob, the designated verifier, can always use his trap-door to simulate a transcript for any statements. Cindy cannot distinguish a valid proof of a true statement from an invalid proof forged by Bob.
A Non-interactive Undeniable Signature Scheme
We use the same denotation as in section 4, where the confirmation scheme consists of a three-move zero-knowledge protocol for proving that Alice's public key YA and the signature s have a common exponent X A with respect t o a public generator g and t,he message rn '. This is a corresponding non-interactive designated verifier proof Constructing a proof:
The prover, Alice, selects 10, r,t E u 2, and calculates T h e designated verifier can simulat,e correct transcripts by selecting d, a , / 3 Eu 2, and calculate
A disavowal scheme can also be described as a series of 3-move protocols [9] which can be merged in a non-interactive designated verifier proof.
Extension to Multiple Designated Verifiers
If Alice in a proof of knowledge wants to convince a set of n verifiers, {Bobi}y=2=, , but only these, the trivial approach is for Alice to convince each individual verifier, Bobi, in an individual proof.
A more appealing approach is the following solution: We will use exactly the same protocol as for only one designated verifier, but let c be a function that is one-way to each coalition of less than n of the designated verifiers, but invertible if they all cooperate. This can easily be done by letting t8he secret key corresponding to the public key used be distributed among all the n designated verifiers so that they all need to cooperate to calculate it. It is, however, not necessary for the designated verifiers to share a secret in advance. For example, using the DL-based commitment scheme (trapdoor commitment scheme number one,) the following modified commit,ment scheme can be used to extend to multiple verifiers, Bob1 to Bob,:
Trapdoor commitment scheme 1, modified for multiple verifiers:
Individual secret keys of the receivers: { . z B , }~=~, ZB, E, 2,. Individual public keys of the receivers: {y~,}r=~, y5, E 2,. Conviction. Each designated verifier would be convinced by the proof as long as he knows that his share of the secret, key has not been compromised. However, no "outsider", Cindy, would be able to receive conviction, as the set of designated verifiers, could have cooperated to cheat her. This they can do without revealing their personal shares of t,he secret key to each other.
Practical Issues
In order to assure that a designated verifier who can be convinced by a proof indeed also is able to simulate identically distributed transcripts, we have t o require that he can only be convinced of a proof designated to him if he knows his secret, key.
Depending on the situation, different relationships bet,ween logical and computational entities will have to be enforced. Somet,imes, it is sufficient to define a logical entity as the set of computational entities who must cooperate in order to output the secret key corresponding to the public key of the logical entity and not enforce any particular rehtionship. One example where this may be sufficient is for a company being the logical entity and its employees being the computational entities. It is in the best interest of the company not to allow a competit,or t,o be part of the set of computational entities, as this makes the company rely on its coinpet,itor for signing, decryption, etc. However, this way of defining logical entities is not appropriate in all settings. We can find an example of such a setting in the motivation for undeniable signatures: A software company will prove validity of signatures, and thereby virus freeness of the corresponding programs, but only to clients who buy this service. Here, the company wants t o make sure that it is not possible for several computational entities t o be one logical entity, thereby letting them all be convinced by one proof of validity.
We see that it is of interest t h a t Bob cannot convince Cindy that he does not know his own secret key, or she would trust that 0 is true upon seeing a proof of 0 V @ B o b . Bob can convince her that he does not know his secret key in one of two ways:
1. Bob shows Cindy a preiniage over a one-way function of his public key, other than his secret key. If Cindy believes that Bob cannot calculate a triple (public key, secret key, other preimage), then she believes that Bob does not know his secret key, and consequently, cannot prove @ B o b . 2. Bob and Cindy secret shares his secret key, which they generated together, and Cindy has not released her share of it to Bob. Here, Cindy and Bob has to collude before the proof session started in order for Cindy to be convinced by the proof of 0.
We suggest two alternative approaches for ensuring that Bob cannot transfer the conviction using the former technique:
1. Before the proof of knowledge of 0 v @Bob from Alice to Bob, Bob has to prove knowledge of @~~b to Alice. 2. When proving @ V @Bob, *41ice probablistically encrypts the transcripts she sends (or parts thereof) using an encryption function for which decryption abilities enables arbitrary collision finding for the trap-door commitment scheme used. This is easily done for our second example of trap-door commitment schemes.
In order t o avoid the second "attack", the sharing of the secret key, we suggest two possible approaches: 8 
Conclusion
We have present,ed a method to designate verifiers, allowing authentication to be combined with privacy (in the sense that the authentication cannot be forwarded to a non-designated partmy.) We have shown how the verification protocol for undeniable signatures can be made designated verifier, and have demonstrated both an interactive and a non-interactive version. We have discussed how the results can be exteiided to multiple designated verifiers, and briefly treated practical issues. This definition captures the fact that Bob is honest (i.e., he engages only in the protocol PB, where this may be a concatenation of any polynomial number of "legal" protocols.) In order to make protocols strong designated verifier transcripts can be probabilistically encrypted using the public key of the intended verifier. No "pure and honest" participant will be agree to decrypt ciphertexts of this particular type. Thus, since Dave will not be able to present the decrypted transcripts to Cindy, and Cindy cannot (due to the probabilistic encryption) distinguish encrypted transcripts from random strings of the same length aiid distribution (which is sampleable,) Dave will be sblc to produce transcripts ( P B , Pb ~ Pc) that Cindy cannot distinguish from transcripts of ( P A ' P B , Po, Pc) 
